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TRANSATLANTIC TRADE IN WOOLLEN CLOTH 1850-1914: THE ROLE OF SHODDY
DAVID T. JENKINS

Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York,
Y01 5DD, England.
THE WORSTED CLOTH TRADE
The factors affecting European trade and competition in worsted
cloth in foreign markets, notably the United States, in the second half
of the nineteenth century are well recorded. From the 1840s the two
main worsted cloth producing countries of Europe, Britain and France,
pursued quite different strategies in production and trade.
Developments in dyeing technology from the late 1830s allowed
substantial improvements in the production of mixed worsted cloth; cloth
of cotton warp and worsted weft.
The British industry rapidly
converted its production to the cheaper mixed worsteds for a much wider
market to the extent that by the late 1850s perhaps only five per cent
of its output remained all-wool cloth. The French industry continued to
concentrate on the production of softer all-wool worsteds, woven from
dry-spun yarn produced on the mule; yarn which dyed better to brilliant
and delicate shades. As a result Britain gained much of the world
market expansion from the 1840s to the 1860s but France retained clear
command of the high quality market.1

conditions. The nature and scale of the problem did not permit easy and
rapid solutions. The raw materials, technology and labour skills
required for all-wool worsted production were quite different and a
rapid conversion to French methods of wool preparation and spinning was
not quickly feasible. The British industry instead pursued a policy,
initially rather slowly, of adapting its existing machinery and
innovating new products, notably worsted coatings. In the two decades
before the First World War it did recoup some of its previous trade
losses but its level of trade did not recover to that of earlier years.2
THE TRADE IN WOOLLEN CLOTH
The relative performance of the European woollen industries is less
well understood. In the second half of the nineteenth century Britain
increased its share of world trade and of the export trade to the United
States.
Trade classification problems prevent exact measurement but
British woollen cloth exports rose significantly in both value and
volume whereas French exports of woollen cloth, although rising to the
1880s, subsequently fell rapidly to a level before the First World War
less than half, by weight, of three decades earlier.3 The German
woollen industry increased its trade but not to the supremacy that was
being forecast in the 1870s and 1880s.4
TABLE 2
WOOL TEXTILE EXPORTS FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES 1880-1913

TABLE 1
UNITED KINGDOM EXPORTS OF WOOLLEN AND WORSTED CLOTH, 1890-1913
annual
averages
1890-4
1895-9
1900-4
1905-9
1910-13
Notes:

Woollen cloths
million yds £ million
50.2
53.1
52.1
78.3
99.9

5.5
5.6
6.0
9.8
13.5

Worsted cloths
million yds £ million
140.0
125.7
101.8

92.8
77.1

8.8
7.6
6.3
6.7
7.0

£ millions
Annual

United

averages

Kingdom

1880-84
1885-89
1890-94
1895-99
1900-04
1905-08
1909-13

18.5
20.1
17.4
16.5
15.8
20.4
24.6

France

Germany

Austro-

Belgium

United
States

1.1
1.0

*
0.03
0.04
0.11
0.13
0.10
0.17

Hungary

14.7
13.9
12.3
11.0

8.7
8.6
8.2

11.3
11.7
10.9
10.5
11.5
13.5
12.8

2.3
2.0
1.6
1.6
1.9
*
2.8

0.9
0.7

0.6
*
0.6

Trade classifications do not permit completely exact division
between woollen and worsted cloth. Data excludes some cloth
not measured by length.
Trade and Navigation Returns.

*comparable figure not available
Source: Committee on Industry and Trade, Survey of Textile Industries
(1928), p. 173.

From the 1860s, however, fashion changes perhaps partly initiated
by the American Civil War, the resultant cotton famine and consequent
alterations in relative raw fibre prices favoured the French, and
growing German, worsted industry. Moreover tariff barriers,
particularly in the United States, were most effective against lower and
medium quality goods to the disadvantage of Britain. As a result the
British worsted industry lost much of its home market to France and
suffered a decline in trade to its major traditional markets, including
the United States. It was much criticized for its lack of adaptation to
French competition and there has subsequently been debate about whether
it was lethargic in changing its technology and product to new market

The question that needs to be pursued, therefore, is why the
British woollen industry maintained its command of trade. And the
hypothesis that is suggested is that it found a very successful way of
cutting its raw material and production costs, through the use of
recovered wool - shoddy and mungo-* - and thus could compete very
effectively on price, whereas the French and to a lesser extent the
Germans, attempted less successfully to compete on quality. The
hypothesis is not new but it has not been closely tested nor has the
significance of recovered wool to the British woollen industry been
fully appreciated.
Recent research has shown that in the second half of the
nineteenth century the use of recovered wool in Britain increased

Source:
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rapidly. It has been calculated that in 1880 about 40 per cent of the
clean wool weight used by the British woollen (as opposed to worsted)
industry was recovered wool. Three decades later the proportion was
around 60 per cent. In other words the British industry was using more
rag wool than new wool. In the main woollen manufacturing district of
Britain - the county of Yorkshire - recovered wool accounted for about
two-thirds of all wool consumed in the decade before the First World
War.6
THE ADVANTAGES OF SHODDY
The term 'shoddy1 has of course acquired a derogatory meaning, but
we should not assume that the use of the recovered wool in yarn and
cloth necessarily meant poor quality in relation to the service the
final product had to provide. Woollen manufacturers judged the blending
of new and recovered wool in ratios appropriate to the nature and use of
the product. Firm quality specifications were imposed by many
customers, particularly ready-made clothing firms, military purchasers
and other official bodies. The skill of British manufacturers in
regulating and adapting blends was well recognised in competing
industries. For example, an American manufacturer commented in 1890:
1

...

in some parts of Europe, especially in Yorkshire,

manufacturers are enabled to get more poor material into yarn than
in any other part of the world, for the simple reason that they are
highly skilled in the art of combining.*'
This blending skill allowed a gradual extension of the use of shoddy and
mungo into a wider range of products. Recovered wool should not
necessarily be seen as an adulterant. Better types of it had qualities
that gave advantages over some lower grades of new wool. Staple length
of shoddy could be longer than some very short new wools. Moreover
shoddy was not just a substitute for virgin wool. Its use provided
particular qualities in cloth - notably a fullness of surface finish.
Thus manufacturers might use it as a supplementary or complementary raw
material.
The extent of the use of recovered wool in the British woollen
trade in the late nineteenth century does suggest that a very high
proportion of the output of the industry included some shoddy and mungo.
The producers of the highest quality cloth in Yorkshire, Scotland and
the West of England would have been very loathe to have admitted
blending recovered wool. Many, no doubt, shunned it but there is
evidence that other high quality producers surreptitiously incorporated
small quantities as a strategy to reduce costs, knowing that it was very
difficult for customers to identify that it had been used. Evidence of
its use might only appear when garments began to lose shape after much
wear - by which time, perhaps, the wearer could not necessarily relate
the cloth to a particular manufacturer especially as many cloths, and
tailored garments, were sold under the name of the merchant rather than
the manufacturer.
The temptations to use shoddy and mungo were strong particularly at
periods of rising new wool prices, as a salesman for one of the major
British woollen manufacturers, the firm of Benjamin Gott, made clear in
the 1860s. He forcefully pointed out:
TYou must make up your mind to do as the first people in the trade
do; put a certain quantity of shoddy in your black cloths up to ll/a yard, but not so much as will interfere materially with the

strength. This you must do or you cannot compete with good houses .
. . I know the use of shoddy is very objectionable to you, but if
the spirit of competition drives you to it, you must do it or be
driven out of the market ... I see no other course.f°
The range of British woollen goods incorporating shoddy, by the
late nineteenth century, was considerable. It included most civil and
military uniform cloth; blankets; flannels; travel rugs; shawls; some
furnishing and carriage fabrics, men's woollen suitings, trouserings and
overcoatings; low and medium quality tweeds; and possibly some quite
high quality tweeds as well.
There is no denial that sometimes products were overadulterated,
thus giving shoddy the bad name it acquired in some quarters. Some
products suffered deterioration of reputation in certain markets but
generally there is evidence to show that manufacturers recognized the
tight-rope they walked. Their success and reputation depended upon
judging a fine balance between price and quality. Finish, in
particular, was vital because it was well understood that a cloth would
sell if it could be made to look equal to a more expensive article
initially, even if its relative weakness and poorer wearing qualities
were recognized.
Perhaps also the market was encouraging the use of recovered wool
in another way. In the British home market, and perhaps elsewhere where
real incomes were rising, and a wider range of attire, including for
leisure purposes, was being demanded it may be that consumers were not
seeking as long a life for their garments as previously and thus the
quality of fibre used in some cloths was becoming less important. The
extent of short term fashion change would appear to have been an
influence here.
The cost and price advantages to British manufacturers in using
recovered wool were significant. The most obvious, and most important,
were that, although price relativities between new and recovered wool
varied, the latter was always significantly lower. Exact comparisons
are not possible because like cannot be compared with like and the range
of new wool prices was wide. But a broad comparison for one period will
illustrate the point. At the end of the nineteenth century American and
Continental manufacturers were turning increasingly to South American
cross-bred wools for their low to medium quality woollen cloth. These
were amongst the cheapest clothing wools on the world market. Early
this century representative shoddy and mungo prices were between twothirds and one-half the price of South American wools. Bearing in mind
the washing, scouring and carbonizing costs of processing these very
dirty wools, and the resultant weight loss, the price difference was
effectively even greater.9
Very roughly fibre content made up from one third to over one half
of the overall cost of manufacturing woollen cloth from new wool. The
figure obviously differed with the type of cloth. A blend of 50 per
cent recovered wool might therefore mean an overall manufacturing cost
reduction of between 15 and 25 per cent.
Individual British manufacturers well understood that the blending
of different qualities of recovered wool with new wool was critical to
their ability to compete on the basis of price and that their blending
skill was crucial to quality and profitability. A Canadian manufacturer
wrote in 1889:
'In these days of keen competition, manufacturers devise all sorts
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of mixtures of stock in order to produce cheap goods, and by skilful
manufacture in the blending of the different fibres, endeavour to
make them appear of much finer quality than they really are.110
A second cost advantage of recovered wool was through its use as a
buffer against rises in new wool prices. There was a quite high short
term elasticity of supply of recovered wool. Rising new wool prices
encouraged more rags on to the market allowing shoddy prices to remain
relatively stable in the face of increased demand. Manufacturers could
thus make rapid alterations in their blends to stabilize cloth prices.
This was clearly a strategy of individual manufacturers and the British
industry as a whole. It has been traced in manufacturers7 blend books.H
Particularly in the two decades before the First World War, when world
wool prices were generally rising quite fast, the use of recovered wool
allowed British manufacturers to stabilize cloth export values better
than the use of new wool would have permitted. In 1909 a large influx
of rags and recovered wool from the U.S.A. permitted British
manufacturers to maintain prices and profit margins better than their
French and German competitors.
A further cost saving advantage might be described as the 'colour
value'. Dyeing was a costly process. Recovered wool could reduce or
eliminate dyeing, and subsequent drying, costs. Rags were sorted into
hundreds of different qualities and colours by the rag dealers.
Manufacturers sought to buy rags and shoddy according to the colour they
required. Colour of yarn was determined by a mixture of pre-dyed wool
and careful shoddy colour selection.
There were cost savings also in wool washing and scouring. But
other costs were increased.
Greater care in blending had cost
implications. Recovered wool generally required lower spinning and
weaving speeds to put less strain on the weaker yarn. As with new wool
manufacturers had to balance speed against risk of breakage. But
technical innovations, such as the Dobcross loom of the 1880s, improved
the weaving of tender yarns.
An overall judgement of the cost reducing implications of the use
of recovered wool is difficult to make in the absence of suitable data
on the breakdown of the various stages of manufacturing costs. It might
be reasonable to estimate the savings of at least 15 - 20 per cent, and
possibly much more, could have resulted from substituting recovered wool
for half the new wool in a medium quality piece of cloth.
The main advantage of these lower production costs in a highly
competitive world market was obviously that the British industry could
undercut its competitors on price. But other implications seem
possible. Lower costs and prices would seem to have enabled British
manufacturers to creep under some tariff barriers and to compete with
the protected home products of their traditional markets.
There is
evidence of this occurring in the highly protected United States market.
Shoddy allowed some British goods to remain competitive with American
products in spite of the specific and ad valorem tariffs. The
difficulties experienced by customs officials in determining fibre
content helped, as a member of the Philadelphia Textile School explained
in 1903:
'The great success of the English and German manufacturers has been
that they knew how to work shoddy better than we did, and even with
the tariff their goods had the call, for it was impossible for any
customs official or expert to determine what is old and what is new

wool in a fabric.'12

Another possible beneficial consequence of recovered wool to the
British industry may have been that the relatively low woollen cloth
prices that shoddy permitted encouraged some substition of woollen cloth
for cotton and worsted cloth in various markets.
The American market was fraught with difficulties for European
woollen cloth manufacturers in the second half of the nineteenth
century. They had to contend with a complex tariff regime that was
often open to adverse interpretation by customs officials. The
regularity of tariff changes hardly allowed market implications to be
fully understood before the situation altered again. Non-tariff, or
indirect, barriers added further problems. The rapidly growing United
States home market was being primarily serviced by the home woollen
industry. Trade barriers were effective in severely curtailing European
trade to the United States. The value of woollen cloth imports to the
United States fluctuated wildly in response to tariff changes but were
roughly halved, comparing the first decade of this century with the
1880s.13
But of this declining trade the British woollen industry gained a
significantly increased share. I am not suggesting that the use of
recovered wool was the only factor which explains Britain's relative
position; there were clearly other considerations. But I do believe
that there is a strong argument to suggest that recovered wool use was
the most significant factor. An American journal, Textile Wool Record,
certainly thought so in 1903. It wrote:
'Yorkshire knowledge and skill in making woollen, worsted and shoddy
goods is one of the factors which makes it impossible for American
manufacturers . . . to compete with the Yorkshire product on even
terms. Yorkshire woollen workers are more skilful than we are,
especially in the art of converting waste woollen products, called
shoddy, into useful and serviceable fabrics.'14
THE USE OF RECOVERED WOOL ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE
If the British industry pursued a deliberate and successful
strategy of using recovered wool, it is necessary to ask why its main
European competitors did not follow its example. European production
and exports of wool textiles were dominated by Britain, France and
Germany. Before the First World War these three countries still
accounted for 85 per cent of European wool textile exports. Most other
European countries had a small export trade but none accounted for more
than five per cent of the European total.15
The use of recovered wool in France and Germany is impossible at
present to determine accurately. Reliable national statistics do not
exist. The industry in France, and individual manufacturers there, were
very coy about admitting to using shoddy. Rags were collected in France
on a widespread basis and France supplied substantial quantities of rags
and shoddy to Britain. Yet the French industry used very little shoddy
itself, even though many of its products could have incorporated at
least some recovered wool. The major areas of woollen manufacture in
Normandy and northern France appear to have largely shunned it. Some
smaller centres did make use of it; notably Vienne in the Rhone valley,
south of Lyons. It is perhaps significant that the woollen industry
survived better in Vienne than in any other French town before the First
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World War. 16 Recovered wool was more widely used in Germany but not to
the same extent, in relation to woollen cloth output, as in Britain.
Why then was there this difference between British and Continental
manufacturers? The reasons for less recovered wool use on the Continent
appear to be a combination of recovered wool supply disadvantages,
technical and labour skill contrasts, and alternative strategies in raw
material use and product.
Rags were collected throughout the Continent of Europe in huge
quantities, each area providing particular types and qualities according
to local clothing styles. The long evolved and complex rag trade to
Britain was not rivalled in France and Germany and there was no quick
and easy means by which the wide range of types and qualities of rags
needed to facilitate the use of shoddy could be created in France and
Germany at the time when it could have been best used.
Labour skills were perhaps less significant. Much was made at the
time of the ability of British woollen spinners to 'spin anything with
two ends' and they could clearly cope with very short fibre shoddy, but
it is not obvious that Continental manufacturers did not have, or could
not have acquired, the blending and spinning skills required. They were
well used to blending new wool and spinning short staple new wool. The
type of spinning and carding machinery used was however a more
significant factor. Much Continental machinery, which had been
developed more and more to cope with South American wools, was not
ideally suited or adaptable for shoddy.17
FIGURE 1
FRENCH EXPORTS OF WOOLLEN AND WORSTED CLOTH 1880/4-1910/13
000 tonnes
13
12
11

Worsted

10
9
8
7
6

competing on quality, or substantially diluting quality to reduce cost
and price. The French industry suffered from indecision. Home market
stagnation and improved quality of output in former major markets,
notably the United States, created a dilemma. The French solution was
an unsatisfactory compromise. Quality of product was reduced through
various cost cuts and some inappropriate technical changes, but costs
were not reduced sufficiently to compete with Britain. French woollen
cloth, as a result, became even more susceptible to competition and to
the constraints of foreign tariffs.1^
Germany pursued a different strategy. It did not have old markets
to defend, but did have a rapidly growing home market. It was creating
new trade. The course it took was to copy the better products of its
competitors but to undercut on quality and price. This tactic hurt
France more than Britain. Germany made little inroad to the British
trade in low price woollen cloth, containing a high proportion of
recovered wool. At the same time Germany was actually improving the
quality and range of its products instead of competing with very cheap
cloths.19
The use of recovered wool is not the sole explanation for Britain's
supremacy in world markets for woollen cloth before World War One.
Other relevant factors appear to have been her ability to service sudden
and substantial military demand at very competitive prices, helped by
the use of shoddy; the size and buoyancy of her home market which
enabled a large manufacturing base to be maintained; and arguably an
efficient entrepreneurial responsiveness to fashion changes. But
recovered wool was the major competitive tool of the British industry
and it exploited very efficiently the cost-reducing properties of shoddy
and mungo.
As a tailpiece it is relevant to point out that in the twentieth
century the most dynamic centre of woollen cloth production in Europe
has been Prato in Italy, where success has owed a great deal to the
use of recovered wool.
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It should also be recognized that Continental manufacturers did
employ other strategies to reduce raw material costs - notably the use
of skin or slipe wool and cheaper South American wools. But the main
explanation would seem to lie in a hesitancy of decision about how to
respond to British competition in foreign markets, including the United
States. The decision was between maintaining quality of product and
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most familiar concepts to historians
interested in Anglo-American topics is that of the Atlantic
Economy.
Political independence did not bring economic
independence to the newly-found United States, and until
after the middle of the nineteenth century trans-Atlantic
trade continued much as it was in the colonial period,
based on the exchange of primary produce for manufactured
goods.
Basic statistics confirm that Britain and the
United States were each the major trading partner of the
other in the first half of the nineteenth century. In this
period, between a third and a half of all U.S. imports were
drawn from Britain (Table 3), while Britain depended on the
U.S. to feed its most important industry, rising American
imports of raw cotton topping 80 per cent of total input at
mid-century (Table 2). Given Britain's global dominance of
cotton manufacturing at the period, it is not surprising
that the U.S. was by no means the only destination of
exports, but exporting obviously began there (with 97 per
cent of the market in the mid 1780s) and even at midcentury was more than a third by value (Table 1).
TABLE 1: U.K. Export of Cotton Goods to the U.S.A.
1784 - 1856 (£OOOs)

1784-6
1794-6
1804-6
1814-16
1824-6
1834-6
1844-6
1854-6

total

U.S.A.

U.S. %

292
2432
7964
7010
6490
7730
6326
10814

213
1540
4550
2405
1883
2296
1077
3809

97.3
63.3
57.1
34.3
29.0
29.7
17.0
35.2

Source: R. Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British
Overseas Trade (Leicester, 1979), p.19.
These figures do not simply confirm the concept of the
Atlantic Economy, they serve as a reminder that cotton
occupied the key role in that complimentary relationship.
At the local level, data on the trans-Atlantic connection
serves to further emphasise its importance; for instance
Sir Francis Baring, the leading London merchant of his day,
estimated in 1812 that between a quarter and a third of
Manchester's trade went to the U.S., and in the satellite
manufacturing town of Bury (where the Peels of calico
printing fame dominated) it was as high as a half. The
-33-

